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Not a Roadmap for Peace 
Erdoğan’s Democratisation Package Defies Kurdish Expectations 
Dilek Kurban 
Despite Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s emphasis to the contrary, the 
“democratisation package” announced on September 30 was expected to be more than just 
another bundle of EU-induced reforms. The much-awaited package came nearly a year after 
the initiation of informal peace talks between the government and Abdullah Öcalan – the 
imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), listed as a terrorist organisation by 
the EU and the US – and six months after Öcalan made a historic call to his fighters to end 
the armed struggle. The package was anticipated as the Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
government’s response to Öcalan’s three-stage road map for peace. Yet, rather than 
legislative changes for a political settlement on the Kurdish question, Erdoğan announced a 
generic harmonisation package, a move which has put into question his government’s 
commitment to the peace process. The fragility of the cease fire between the PKK and the 
Turkish military and the urgency of radical reforms to prevent a deadlock in the peace 
process render the AKP’s piecemeal approach to democratisation too costly at this point in 
time. With the EU’s opening of negotiations on Chapter 22 on regional policy, which 
pertains to decentralisation in governance and is thus relevant for a political solution to the 
Kurdish question, there is a real and urgent need for European policy makers to be involved 
in the peace process in Turkey. 
 
On September 30, in a press conference 
broadcasted live, Prime Minister Erdoğan 
launched the “democratisation package” 
long anticipated by the Kurdish opposition, 
the Turkish society and the European 
Union. As the nation held its breath and 
listened to every word he uttered, Erdoğan 
announced, among other things, that ele-
mentary school pupils were no longer 
required to take an oath of allegiance to 
the Turkish nation; that the letters x, q 
and w were now free to be used in official 
documents; that all female public servants 
who were not required to wear official 
attire could now wear the headscarf; that 
politicians could speak “languages other 
than Turkish” in their election campaigns; 
that political parties were allowed to have 
two co-chairs; that he was open to discus-
sions on the nation-wide 10 per cent elec-
toral threshold, provided that the choice is 
between two options that he has proposed; 
and that education in “languages other than 
Turkish” was now allowed in private schools. 
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Had Erdoğan made this announcement 
after the opening of the EU accession talks 
in 2005 or as part of his government pro-
gramme after his re-election in 2007, or 
even in the context of the “Kurdish open-
ing” in 2009, many more people than just 
core constituents, party members and 
supporters in the pro-government media 
would have wholeheartedly welcomed the 
measures. However, Erdoğan’s speech came 
nearly a year after the launch of informal 
peace talks and six months after Öcalan’s 
historic announcement on 21 March 2013 
that the era of armed insurrection against 
the Turkish state was over. It was in 
response to Öcalan’s call and in confidence 
of the road map he outlined in a series of 
letters delivered by the Peace and Democ-
racy Party (BDP) delegation stating that the 
PKK’s military leadership in Iraqi Kurdistan 
had ordered an indefinite ceasefire and had 
started to withdraw its fighters beyond the 
Turkish borders. As conveyed to the media 
by the PKK’s top military leaders and by 
the BDP delegation, which was acting as a 
messenger between Öcalan and the PKK 
leadership, Öcalan envisioned a three-stage 
peace process, starting with the PKK with-
drawal, continuing with legal reforms 
granting the Kurds their full political and 
language rights, and ending with the re-
integration of the soon-to-be-ex PKK com-
batants into normal life (for more on the 
peace process, see SWP Comments 13/2013, 
Erdoğan and Öcalan Begin Peace Talks by Kevin 
Matthees and Günter Seufert). These devel-
opments turned all eyes to the AKP govern-
ment, which was successfully put under 
the spotlight by the Kurdish political move-
ment as the player with the ball in its court. 
It was in this political context that 
Erdoğan announced the democratisation 
package. Although the AKP officials have 
time and again emphasised that the re-
forms were not their “response” to Öcalan, 
and while Erdoğan persistently rejected 
that his government was negotiating with 
the PKK leader, the package was expected 
as Erdoğan’s long -awaited response to 
Öcalan’s peace initiative. Despite Erdoğan’s 
repeated emphasis to the contrary, this 
was not expected to be just another reform 
package. Much more was at stake than 
the harmonisation of the laws with the EU 
acquis or the advancement of individual 
rights and liberties. 
Continuity with the state tradition: 
Piecemeal and implicit reformism 
As Erdoğan repeatedly stressed in his intro-
ductory remarks on September 30, this is 
not the first reform package adopted by his 
government. Already, the coalition govern-
ment predating the AKP had enacted high-
profile reforms for harmonising Turkey’s 
laws with the EU acquis and executing 
the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR). Some of these re-
forms were directly related to the Kurdish 
question, including the abolishment of the 
death penalty (rescuing the life of Öcalan), 
the removal of the constitutional bans on 
the use of Kurdish and the permission 
to teach Kurdish in private courses and 
to broadcast in Kurdish. After it came to 
power in November 2002, the AKP con-
tinued the reforms with an accelerated 
pace, adopting a series of packages that 
included the enactment of a compensation 
law for displaced Kurdish villagers, the 
abolishment of the state security courts 
and the lifting of the state of emergency 
regime in the remaining two provinces in 
the Kurdish region. 
The latest democratisation package 
builds upon the gradualist approach of 
prior reforms, thereby leaving room for 
further improvement. Take the example of 
the teaching of Kurdish. The reforms in this 
area started in August 2002, before the AKP 
came to power, with the opening of private 
Kurdish courses and were continued by the 
AKP government with the selective opening 
of Kurdish language and literature depart-
ments at universities from 2009 onwards. 
In April 2012, on-demand elective courses 
in “living languages and dialects”, includ-
ing Kurdish, were introduced in secondary 
schools. These courses are offered for two 
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hours per week at schools where a mini-
mum of 10 students opt for them. With 
the latest package, Kurds are now granted 
the ability to have education offered in 
their mother tongue in private schools, the 
details of which will be laid down by law. 
Publicly funded education in the mother 
tongue will need to wait for the time being. 
As in previous reforms, the democrati-
sation package does not make any explicit 
reference to Kurdish. Throughout the 
Republic, neither the constitutional and 
legislative provisions prohibiting the use 
of Kurdish nor successive changes that 
gradually removed such bans have ever 
uttered the word “Kurd” or “Kurdish”. The 
official policy of denying Kurdish legal 
recognition remains intact, even though 
the AKP has long departed from the state 
tradition at the discursive and policy levels 
by extending political recognition to the 
Kurds. Although declaring “freedom to 
keyboards” through the legalisation of the 
use of the letters x, q and w as well as an-
nouncing that private education “in differ-
ent languages and dialects” will be allowed, 
the Prime Minister again refrained from 
explicitly referring to Kurds or Kurdish. 
In order to prevent a perception that the 
democratisation package was tailored for 
the Kurds or was a concession to Öcalan, 
the AKP government continues its balanc-
ing act based on a “little bit of everything, 
and not too much of anything” approach to 
reforms – as evident in the inclusion in the 
same package of the easing of restrictions 
on the headscarf ban, new language rights 
for the Kurds and the return of confiscated 
properties to an Assyrian monastery. 
What is in the democratisation 
package for the Kurds? 
Political party and election reforms 
Erdoğan stated that the amendments in 
the laws pertaining to political parties and 
elections were intended to facilitate politi-
cal participation and ensure fairness in 
competition. In the name of the former, a 
number of stringent conditions imposed on 
political parties will be removed. Whoever 
can vote can be a political party member; 
parties are no longer obliged to open offices 
in small administrative units and can have 
(up to two) co-chairs; and it is no longer a 
crime to speak Kurdish in political cam-
paigning. The Prime Minister’s speech left 
uncertain the scope of the amendments 
concerning the use of Kurdish in politics. 
Both the Law on Political Parties (no. 2820) 
and the Law on the Fundamental Principles 
of Elections (no. 298) have provisions that 
ban the use of unofficial languages in pri-
mary elections and in elections. According 
to Article 58 of the Law on the Fundamen-
tal Principles of Elections, “political parties 
and their candidates shall use Turkish in 
their propaganda.” Erdoğan said this article 
will be amended to allow the use of other 
languages. Article 43 of the Law on Political 
Parties prohibits candidates from using 
unofficial languages in the primaries. This 
provision, too, will be amended. However, 
the Prime Minister did not mention Article 
81(c) of the same law, which prohibits politi-
cal parties from using unofficial languages 
in their election and other campaigns, 
meetings, congresses and written materials. 
Pending the release of the draft amend-
ments, the status of the ban on political 
parties remains unclear. 
To improve fairness in competition, po-
litical parties that have received 3 per cent 
of the national votes in the last general 
election will be entitled to receive finan-
cial aid from the Treasury (this threshold 
is currently 7 per cent). As for the highest 
national electoral threshold in Europe 
(10 per cent), Erdoğan proposed two alter-
natives: lowering the threshold to 5 per 
cent and narrowing electoral constituencies 
to five seats, or removing it altogether in 
a single-member-district system. 
From the perspective of the BDP, the 
legalisation of the co-chair system will not 
have a practical effect, since the party has 
always had co-chairpersonship in defiance 
of the ban. For the BDP and the pro-Kurdish 
political movement in general, the rele-
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vant changes are the legalisation of the use 
of Kurdish in election campaigning and 
the loosening of the eligibility criteria for 
public financing of political parties. The 
decriminalisation of Kurdish dates back 
to 1991, when the ban on the use of this 
language in daily life was abolished. Com-
ing 20 years after this first step, the legali-
sation of politicians’ use of Kurdish is a 
much belated measure, particularly for 
a government that launched the self-
proclaimed “Kurdish opening” in 2009 
and established university departments 
on Kurdish language and literature. The 
amendment also lags behind the social 
realities on the ground. In the Kurdish 
region, where people in some parts do not 
understand Turkish, politicians – both from 
the pro-Kurdish parties and the AKP – have 
long addressed their constituents in their 
mother tongue. Yet, it was the politicians 
from pro-Kurdish and leftwing political par-
ties who were convicted for violating the 
law, as evident in the ECtHR’s 2013 judg-
ment of Sukran Aydin and Others v. Turkey. In 
its ruling, the Court held that “a total pro-
hibition on the use of unofficial languages 
coupled with criminal sanctions” was a 
violation of freedom of expression. It was 
Turkey’s obligation to comply with this 
judgment and its willingness to deter sim-
ilar rulings in the future by the ECtHR – 
and not the pursuit of fair play as such – 
that prompted the AKP to change the laws 
governing political parties and elections. 
At first glance, the announced changes 
in rules concerning public financing of 
political parties will be beneficial for the 
BDP. The lowering of the eligibility thresh-
old from 7 to 3 per cent will allow for a 
more egalitarian distribution of public 
funds to political parties across the spec-
trum. In practice, the situation will likely 
be more complex. First, the BDP will not be 
eligible to benefit from the new eligibility 
criteria until after the 2015 general elec-
tions, based on the percentage of the votes 
it will receive. Judging from the perform-
ance of the BDP’s predecessors in past elec-
tions, the BDP will easily qualify for public 
financing. However, this, of course, will 
only be possible if the BDP decides to con-
tend in the 2015 elections institutionally 
rather than through independent candi-
dates. 
The last time the pro-Kurdish political 
movement competed in the general elec-
tions through a political party was in 
2002, when the Democratic People’s Party 
(DEHAP) received 6.2 per cent of the votes 
nationwide, coming in below the 10 per 
cent electoral threshold. The movement’s 
inability to enter into the parliament since 
the 1995 national elections led the Demo-
cratic Society Party (DTP) – DEHAP’s succes-
sor and the BDP’s predecessor – to change 
course in the run-up to the 2007 elections. 
The DTP decided to compete through inde-
pendent candidates, for whom the electoral 
threshold does not apply. This strategic 
decision paid off: 20 candidates supported 
by the DTP were elected and formed their 
own political group as soon as they entered 
the parliament (a 21st deputy later joined 
them). The BDP resorted to the same strat-
egy in the 2011 general elections and had 
36 of its independent candidates enter the 
parliament and form a political group. 
Thus, the liberalisation of rules for the 
public financing of political parties will 
leave the BDP with a difficult decision: 
either enter the 2015 general elections 
institutionally (and once again face the 
hurdle of the 10 per cent threshold) or con-
tinue with independent candidates at the 
cost of foregoing the prospect of receiving 
public financial assistance. On a related 
note, the current 7 per cent threshold was 
introduced in 2005 during the AKP’s term. 
Between 1990 and 2005, the Law on Politi-
cal Parties allowed the public financing of 
political parties that had a certain number 
of deputies in the parliament, irrespective 
of whether they had entered the elections. 
The minimum number of deputies required 
was initially 10 and was later reduced to 
three. This allowed the People’s Labor Party 
(HEP), which had entered into the parlia-
ment through a pre-election coalition with 
a social democratic party, to receive fund-
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ing from the Treasury. HEP and its succes-
sor, the Democracy Party, received public 
financing from HEP’s entry into the parlia-
ment in 1991 until the latter was banned in 
1994. The movement’s 13 years of absence 
in the parliament came to an end in 2007, 
when the DTP decided to run through in-
dividual candidates. However, rules govern-
ing the public financing of political parties 
had changed in the meantime through a 
2005 amendment to the Law on Political 
Parties, which introduced the current 7 
per cent threshold as the single criteria for 
eligibility for public financing. 
This makes Erdoğan’s proposals for 
lowering the electoral threshold all the 
more important for the secular Kurdish 
national political movement. If the thresh-
old is lowered (down to a level that the BDP 
feels confident it can pass), then the BDP 
could indeed consider entering into the 
2015 elections. At any rate, experts and the 
BDP argue that both of the alternatives pro-
posed by Erdoğan would be beneficial to 
the AKP and would not facilitate the BDP’s 
representation outside of the Kurdish re-
gion. Commenting on the democratisation 
package, the BDP’s co-chairman found both 
alternatives unacceptable on the grounds 
that they would serve to “trap” the party in 
the Kurdish-dominated region and prevent 
it from receiving winning votes from the 
rest of the country. BDP sources propose in-
stead to lower the threshold to 3 per cent. 
Language rights 
The package introduces reforms concerning 
the use of minority languages in official 
documents and in education. The authori-
sation of the use of q, x and w will enable 
Kurds to register names containing these 
letters. The BDP-run municipalities have 
already created a de facto situation in the 
Kurdish region whereby the local authori-
ties use these letters in official correspon-
dence and documents, as well as in names 
of public spaces. The reform is significant, 
however, in that it will enable the Kurds 
to use these letters in official documents 
issued by the national government, such as 
identification cards. Moreover, the official 
use of the Kurdish alphabet in a country 
where the state has long denied the exis-
tence of the Kurdish language has a sym-
bolic value that goes beyond its practical 
implications. 
The Prime Minister announced that 
the official re-adoption of the old names 
of villages, districts and provinces will be 
made possible. Accordingly, changing the 
names of villages will need the authori-
sation of the Ministry of Interior, while 
requests for districts and provinces will be 
evaluated by the Cabinet of Ministers, since 
they require legislative amendments. The 
processes through which these reforms 
will be implemented and how competing 
requests for new names will be evaluated 
remain to be seen. In the name of democ-
ratic participation and governance, the gov-
ernment would have made a better policy 
choice by leaving these decisions to bottom-
up processes at the local level. Further-
more, it is difficult to understand why the 
scope of the reform is limited to names 
changed after the 1980 military coup. The 
Turkification of place names is an estab-
lished state policy from before 1980. 
Although the gradual abandonment 
of this assimilationist policy is important, 
there is again a time-lag here. In the past 
few years, as part of their multilingual mu-
nicipal services campaigns, the BDP-run 
municipalities have de facto restored the orig-
inal Kurdish – and in some cases Armenian 
– names of villages across the region. The 
reform is nonetheless significant in that the 
legalisation of this practice will save the BDP 
officials from prosecution. Furthermore, 
the possibility to change the names of dis-
tricts and provinces, which falls outside the 
mandate of municipalities, will enable local 
communities across Turkey to pressure the 
central government on this front. 
Finally, the package has opened the way 
to education being offered in Kurdish in 
private schools. Mother tongue education 
has been a long-standing demand of the 
pro-Kurdish political movement in Turkey. 
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Though developed and strengthened by the 
secular Kurdish national movement (the 
BDP and the PKK), the demand to receive 
bilingual or multilingual education is vir-
tually shared by all Kurds in the region, in-
cluding the AKP constituency and the new-
ly formed Kurdish Islamist parties. Many 
Kurds want to be taught in their mother 
tongue at every level of the education sys-
tem, and they demand that this education 
is provided in public schools. In addition to 
the BDP, numerous NGOs and academics in 
the region, in Istanbul and in Europe have 
worked for the standardisation of Kurdish 
languages and built a considerable exper-
tise in multilingual education within the 
last decade. Inspired by the experiences 
of other assimilated peoples, such as the 
Catalans during the Franco regime, these 
actors are designing curricula, developing 
teaching methods and grooming future 
teachers of the Kurdish languages in order 
to be ready, if and when public education 
in Kurdish commences. 
The limitation of education in Kurdish to 
private institutions was received with criti-
cism by the pro-Kurdish movement across 
the political spectrum. Pointing out that 
the majority of Kurds in the region are very 
poor, critics find the privatisation of edu-
cation in the mother tongue to be discrim-
inatory in socio-economic terms. While 
pointing out that only the Turks are en-
titled to receive public education in their 
mother tongue, they find the denial of 
this right to the Kurds and other minority 
groups – who, as taxpayers, are entitled to 
comparable public services as the Turks – to 
constitute ethnic discrimination. Holding 
the government solely responsible for the 
denial of public education in Kurdish would 
be an incomplete analysis, however. There 
is a constitutional barrier to teaching un-
official languages in public schools, and the 
AKP does not have the requisite majority 
in the parliament to make constitutional 
amendments. Indeed, this has been one 
of the most contested issues among the 
four political parties in the Parliamen-
tary Conciliation Committee tasked with 
drafting a new constitution. On the other 
hand, during the committee deliberations 
on this issue in August 2013, the AKP 
voted with the Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP) against the BDP’s proposal for edu-
cation in the mother tongue in public 
schools. 
The have-nots of the 
democratisation package 
Perhaps the most important expectation 
of the BDP from this package was for the 
introduction of drastic revisions in the 
penal laws, including the Anti-Terror Law. 
This would open the way for the release of 
hundreds of BDP members detained on 
remand for more than four years, pending 
prosecution. Currently, according to infor-
mation provided by the BDP, the party 
has 6 parliamentarians, 21 mayors and 91 
members of municipal councils in prisons. 
In addition to these elected officials, 6 cen-
tral executive committee members, 2 dep-
uty co-chairpersons, 57 party assembly 
members and around 200 party executives 
of the BDP have also been detained on 
remand. In addition, there are hundreds 
of BDP-affiliated activists as well as other 
activists, lawyers, journalists and students 
in prisons on charges of membership in the 
Union of Kurdistan Communities/Turkey 
Assembly (KCK/TM). The KCK was estab-
lished by the PKK in 2005 upon the instruc-
tions of Öcalan and was intended to put 
into effect his ideology of “democratic con-
federalism”, which seeks to bring together 
political parties, civil society organisations 
and armed groups affiliated with the PKK 
in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria. Prosecutors 
allege that the KCK/TM was established by 
the PKK for the purpose of carrying out 
terroristic activities and PKK propaganda in 
urban areas. Some detainees are accused 
of the use of – or the threat of the use of – 
violence and/or coercion. Others, however, 
are charged with “making the propaganda 
of a terrorist organisation”, simply for 
advocating the same political demands as 
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the PKK, such as education in the mother 
tongue and administrative autonomy for 
the Kurds. The evidence cited against these 
individuals include: participating in mass 
demonstrations during Kurdish New Year 
celebrations as well as on World’s Women’s 
Day and Human Rights Day; citing in their 
news articles the PKK leaders and/or PKK’s 
written materials; and even filing petitions 
with the ECtHR. Due to the over-inclusive 
definition of terrorism in Turkey’s penal 
laws, those accused of undertaking or plan-
ning acts of terrorism and resorting to 
violence have been lumped together under 
the KCK rubric with those who exercised 
their constitutional rights to free speech 
and to demonstrate. 
The BDP was expecting legal changes 
to allow the immediate release of the 
detainees in the second category, which 
includes elected political representatives 
who still hold titles to their offices. The 
release of mayors and other municipal 
officials is particularly urgent for the BDP 
in light of the upcoming municipal elec-
tions in March 2014. The imprisonment of 
more than 100 elected officials as well as 
cadres experienced in local governance 
makes it difficult for the party to find eli-
gible candidates to run for office, “adversely 
affecting the exercise of regional and local 
democracy”, as noted by the European 
Commission in its progress report released 
on 16 October 2013. Although the courts 
released a number of current and former 
mayors and municipal officials during the 
course of 2013, an en masse discharge re-
quires legislative intervention. The need for 
comprehensive reforms in Turkey’s crimi-
nal justice system is also being expressed by 
international observers, first and foremost 
the EU. Despite external and internal pres-
sures, however, the AKP does not yet have 
the political will to allow the selective 
release of KCK detainees. In light of the 
fierce political competition between the 
AKP and the BDP and the approaching 
municipal elections, Erdoğan’s persistence 
calls into question his emphasis on fairness 
in political competition. 
The democratisation package 
and the peace process: 
Is there a role for the EU? 
Even outside the context of the peace nego-
tiations between the PKK and the govern-
ment, the reforms fall short of a “democra-
tisation package” expected from a govern-
ment that is committed to complying with 
the ECtHR judgments and that is in acces-
sion negotiations with the EU. The AKP has 
gained sufficient understanding about the 
root causes of Turkey’s democratic deficit 
to know what needs to be done. After a long 
series of consultations with the Kurdish, 
the heterodox Alevi, the Roma and non-
Muslim communities as part of the “open-
ings” launched since 2009, and after three 
years of a constitution-making process 
where reform demands were collected from 
across the nation, the AKP knows too well 
the basic demands of its citizens for equal-
ity, justice and democracy. 
Certainly the presence of a reform-resis-
tant opposition in the parliament does not 
make life easy for the government. The 
immediate opposition of the CHP and MHP 
leaders to the abolishment of a student oath 
reminiscent of the 1930s’ totalitarian ideol-
ogy once again demonstrated the absence 
of a political opposition that is willing and 
able to push the AKP in the direction of 
more democracy. One group of CHP depu-
ties has already filed a court case against 
the easing of the headscarf ban, whereas 
another submitted a legal proposal to the 
parliament for the re-introduction of the 
student oath in primary schools. Because 
the two largest opposition parties in the 
parliament staunchly resist the acknowl-
edgment of ethnical and religious plural-
ism, there is some merit for the govern-
ment to be defensive about the slowness 
of the reform process. 
However, the state of the main opposi-
tion parties is only part of the story. In the 
remaining part are political and social 
factors that are favourable for a political 
settlement of the Kurdish question: a fast-
changing society that has long understood 
that the Kurds will, if not should, be given 
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their rights, at least for the sake of peace 
and stability; a pro-Kurdish political party 
that has been constructive in its opposition 
to the AKP since the launch of the peace 
talks with Öcalan; and last but not least, an 
EU wherein key member state governments 
seem to have understood the mistake they 
had made in blocking chapters and are now 
willing to restart the accession negotiations 
with Turkey. Perhaps most importantly, the 
domestic and international developments 
of the past year – from the unexpected Gezi 
protests, which cost the government a great 
deal in terms of its international reputa-
tion, to the developments in Syria, where 
the AKP’s foreign policy vision has been dis-
credited and a de facto autonomous Kurdish 
region emerged – have helped the AKP to 
realise that the EU does matter and that a 
political solution to the Kurdish question 
is indispensable for political stability and 
economic growth. It is not a coincidence 
that Erdoğan announced the democratisa-
tion package two weeks before the release 
of the progress report. 
Notwithstanding Erdoğan’s recent popu-
list arguments about the survival of tute-
lage and anti-democratic forces in Turkey, 
the AKP has the political power to move 
Turkey out of the league of semi-democ-
racies. Having won its fight with the mili-
tary, overcome anti-democratic attempts 
to bring an end to its rule, silenced the 
judicial and bureaucratic resistance to its 
policies, and created an extremely pro-
government mainstream media through 
a combination of indirect control and 
intimidation, Erdoğan is in a position of 
power not only to pass constitutional and 
legislative changes on any issue but also to 
mobilise public support for even the most 
“radical” reforms concerning the Kurdish 
question. What he lacks is the political will 
to do so. While part of the problem is his – 
arguably understandable – unwillingness to 
risk the AKP’s one-party rule, the rest is his 
government’s selective embrace of demo-
cratic principles of equality and human 
rights. 
And herein lies an important role for 
European policy makers. With the positive 
atmosphere that the Commission’s progress 
report created in EU-Turkey relations – and 
the European Council’s decision to open on 
November 5 a new chapter for negotiations 
with Turkey – there is much that Europe 
can and should do to expedite the democra-
tisation process in general, and the peace 
process in particular. The fact that the soon-
to-be-implemented Chapter 22 on regional 
policy concerns decentralisation in 
governance – and is thus directly relevant 
for the pro-Kurdish political movement’s 
demands for administrative autonomy in 
the Kurdish region – renders the EU’s active 
involvement at this point in time all the 
more important. 
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